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CHAPTER 2 
Constitutional Law 
MARC G. PERLIN* 
§ 2.1. Introduction. During 1980, controversial legislative enactments 
dealing with capital punishment and school prayers, issues which have 
divided national public opinion for over a decade, were tested in the 
Supreme Judicial Court. The Court held both enactments unconstitutional. 
In District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson, 1 the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the legislature's attempt to draft a death penalty 
law consistent with federal constitutional standards nevertheless failed to 
meet the more stringent standards demanded by the Massachusetts Consti-
tution. In Kent v. Commissioner of Education, 2 the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that a statute which established a daily period of prayer in the public 
classroom violated the first amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Consequently, the Court did not decide the constitutionality of school 
prayers under the Massachusetts Constitution. 
A third major case discussed in this chapter, Matter of Spring, 3 traces the 
continuing evolution in Massachusetts of the constitutional right to refuse 
medical treatment, a right grounded in both federal and state law sources. 
In Spring, the Supreme Judicial Court held that this right of bodily integrity 
prevailed over the state interests in continuing the involuntary medical treat-
ment of a terminally ill patient. 
§ 2.2. The Death Penalty: Cruel or Unusual Punishment. Justice Mar-
shall, commenting in 1980 on the United States Supreme Court's continuing 
attempt to prevent arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, predicted that 
"the enterprise on which the Court embarked in Gregg v. Georgia 1 [in 1976] 
*Copyright Marc G. Perlin. MARC G. PERLIN is an Associate Professor of Law at Suf· 
folk University Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the able research assistance 
of Patricia Noyes in the preparation of this chapter. 
§ 2.1 1 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2231, 411 N.E.2d 1274. See§ 2 infra. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 803, 402 N.E.2d 1340. See§ 3 infra. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 405 N.E.2d 115. See§ 4 infra. 
§ 2.2. 1 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gregg was one of a series of 1976 cases in which the Supreme 
Court held that state capital punishment laws could withstand an eighth amendment attack if 
the laws guided the sentencing body and reduced its discretion in imposing the death sentence. 
Id. at 195. 
Gregg upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's capital sentencing provisions which provided 
for a bifurcated trial where guilt and punishment were determined at separate hearings; where 
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increasingly appears to be doomed to failure." Acknowledging that 
appellate courts were powerless to ensure even-handed application of the 
death penalty, he urged his colleagues to abandon the death penalty. 2 Dur-
ing the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted 
the essence of Justice Marshall's position and brought an end to the 
legislative attempt to reinstitute capital punishment in Massachusetts. In 
District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson, 3 the Court held that 
the death penalty offended contemporary standards and that the death 
penalty had been applied in an arbitrary manner, in violation of the 
Massachusetts Constitution.• Watson represents yet another example ofthe 
increasing reliance by state courts on state constitutional provisions to pro-
tect individual rights. This reliance on state constitutions has grown 
dramatically since the middle of the 1970s and has been advocated by some 
members of the United States Supreme Court.' 
The decision in Watson is the culmination of a series of Supreme Judicial 
Court decisions, beginning in 1975, which signal the demise of legislatively-
authorized capital punishment in Massachusetts. In the 1975 case of Com-
monwealth v. O'Neal (O'Neal 1),6 the Court reviewed a Massachusetts 
statute which provided foc a mandatory death sentence to punish a murder 
committed during a rape. 7 The Court held that under both the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment and the cognate provisions of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, the right to life was fundamental. • By impos-
ing the death penalty, the state infringes on a fundamental right, and "trig-
the sentencing body had to find at least one of ten statutory aggravating factors prior to impos-
ing death. In addition, the statute provided for speedy appellate review by the Georgia 
Supreme Court. The statute directed the state supreme court to consider whether imposition of 
death in the case before it was the product of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence sup-
ported the finding of a statutory aggravating factor, and whether the sentence was dispropor-
tionate in comparison with similar cases. Id. at 162-68. 
For an analysis of the 1976 cases, see Comment, Constituional Law, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASs. 
LAW § 13.5, at 387-434. See also Barry, Furman to Gregg: The Judicial and Legislative 
History, 22 How. L.J. 53 (1979). 
' Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 434 (1980) (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., concurring in 
the judgment). Since the 1976 opinions upholding the federal constitutionality of a properly 
drafted death penalty law, Justices Marshall and Brennan consistently have taken the position 
that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional. See; e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,646 
(1980) (Brennan, J., concurring, and Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2231, 411 N.E.2d 1274. 
• Id. at 2232, 411 N.E.2d at 1275. 
' See Perlin, Constitutional Law, 1979 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAw§ 7.1, at 202-03 and notes 8 
& 9; Ortwein, Constitutional Law, 1978 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 12.4 at 282. See also 
Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate 
Provisions of The United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 887, 927-28 (1980). 
• 367 Mass. 440, 327 N.E.2d 662 (1975). 
' Id. at 441, 327 N.E.2d at 663. 
• Id. at 449-50, 327 N.E.2d at 668-69. 
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gers strict scrutiny under the compelling State interest and least restrictive 
means test. Thus, in order for the State to allow the taking of life by 
legislative mandate it must demonstrate that such action is the least restric-
tive means toward furtherance of a compelling governmental end."' The 
Court thereupon allowed the parties a period of time to file briefs address-
ing whether the imposition of the death penalty advanced a compelling state 
interest that could not be advanced as effectively by a sentence of life im-
prisonment.10 
Later in 1975, the Court responded to the Commonwealth's attempt to 
demonstrate the state's interest in imposing the death penalty. In Com-
monwealth v. O'Neal (O'Neal 11), 11 the Court held that the mandatory 
death provision in the rape-murder statute violated the Massachusetts con-
stitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishments. 12 
The approach of the Supreme Judicial Court in the O'Neal cases was 
unlike that of the United States Supreme Court in its death penalty cases. 
Instead of determining whether the punishment of death was cruel and 
unusual because it may have violated contemporary standards of decency, 
or because it may have constituted torture, 13 the Supreme Judicial Court 
relied on the preferred status of life as a state constitutional standard, as 
well as the state constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punish-
ments.14 Since the right to life is the most fundamental of all rights, the 
• /d. at 449-50, 327 N.E.2d at 668. See also Note, The Impact of A Sliding-Scale Approach 
To Due Process Of Capital Punishment Litigation, 30 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 675 (1979). 
•• 367 Mass. at 449-50, 327 N.E.2d at 668-69. 
" 369 Mass. at 242, 339 N.E.2d 676 (1975). 
12 The judgment imposing the death sentence was reversed by a per curiam order of the 
Supreme Judicial Court. /d. Chief Justice Tauro concurred iil an opinion which relied on an 
analysis emphasizing the fundamental right to life, an approach he believed was required by 
both the due process guarantees of the Declaration of Rights and the prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishments in art. 26 of the Declaration of Rights. Id. at 244-73, 339 N.E.2d at 
677-93 (Tauro, J., concurring). Justice Hennessey concurred in this analysis. Id. at 274-75, 339 
N.E.2d at 693-94 (Hennessey, J., concurring). Apparently, these Justices chose to base their 
decision solely on the Massachusetts Constitution, avoiding reliance on a fundamental right to 
life analysis under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. (In 0 'Neal/, 
the Court had relied on the fourteenth amendment as well as on the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion. See 367 Mass. at 447-48 n.5, 327 N.E.2d at 667, n.5). Justices Wilkins and Kaplan con-
curred in the result in O'Neal II, relying solely on art. 26. 369 Mass. at 276-79, 339 N.E.2d at 
695-96 (Wilkins, J ., concurring and Kaplan, J ., concurring). Justice Braucher concurred in the 
result, but on the basis of statutory construction. On the constitutional issue, Justice Braucher 
joined the dissenting opinions of Justices Reardon and Quirico. /d. at 279-83, 339 N.E.2d at 
696-98 (Braucher, J., concurring in the result). 
For an analysis of O'Neal II, see Comment, Constitutional Law, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASs. 
LAW§ 13.5, at 397. 
" See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). 
•• "We elect instead to adopt an approach free from the abundant commentary and ex-
haustive material surrounc .• ng the F' · '•th Amendment route." 367 Mass. at 447, 327 N .E.2d at 
667. But see note 12 supra. 
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Court essentially imposed upon the state the burden of proving that the 
death penalty contributed more to accomplishing a legitimate state purpose, 
such as deterrence or retribution, than the less drastic punishment of life im-
prisonment. It was this burden that the state failed to meet in O'Neal /1. 1' 
Two years after the O'Neal cases, the Supreme Judicial Court was asked 
to render an advisory opinion to the House of Representatives on the validi-
ty under the state constitution of a bill providing for capital punishment in 
first degree murder cases. 16 The bill was modeled generally after the Georgia 
statute upheld on federal constitutional grounds in Gregg. •' The proposed 
legislation provided for a trial with separate guilt and penalty stages; con-
sideration by the sentencing body of extenuating, mitigating, and ag-
gravating circumstances; and automatic review by the Supreme Judicial 
Court to guard against arbitrary infliction of the death penalty and to en-
sure consistency in application of punishment. 11 The Court's advisory opin-
ion recognized the same state constitutional deficiencies in the bill which it 
had found earlier in O'Neal II. Specifically, the Court held that the Com-
monwealth failed to meet its burden of proving that a legitimate state pur-
pose would be promoted better by the imposition of the death penalty than 
by a sentence of life imprisonment. 19 Perhaps foreshadowing the result in 
Watson, the Court stressed in the advisory opinion that it would not accept 
a legislative determination of the efficacy of capital punishment based on 
speculation that there was no less restrictive alternative. 20 
With the guidance provided by these opinions, and in response to what it 
perceived to be the sentiment of a large segment of the Commonwealth, 21 
" 369 Mass. at 243, 339 N.E.2d at 677. 
" Opinion Of The Justices To The House of Representatives, 372 Mass. 912, 364 N.E.2d 
184 (1977). 
" /d. at 920, 344 N.E.2d at 188. 
" /d. at 913-16, 364 N.E.2d at 184-86. 
" /d. at 917, 364 N.E.2d at 186-87. 
20 ld. 
21 The legislature not only acknowledged that its capital punishment bill was in response to 
its assessment of the wishings of the state's voting population, but also used that opportunity 
to address its stance on the separation of judicial and legislative powers: 
[T)he ability of the people of the commonwealth to express their preference through 
their duly elected representatives must not be shut off by the intervention of the judicial 
department on the basis of a constitutional test intertwined with an assessment of con-
temporary standards and that the judgment of the general court [the legislature] weighs 
heavily in ascertaining such standards in this commonwealth. It is hereby further 
declared that in a democratic society, legislatures, and here, in this commonwealth, the 
general court, is the body constituted to respond to the will of the people. It iS' hereby 
further declared that the declarations set forth above include and reflect the declara-
tions already made by the highest court of the land which express that this subject of 
whether there be or not be capital punishment in any state is peculiarly questions of 
legislative, not judicial decision, and, in this commonwealth, that question is one for the 
general court to decide .... 
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the legislature set out once again to draft a capital punishment law to satisfy 
the constitutional requirements of O'Neal II. In 1979, the legislature 
enacted "An Act Providing for Capital Punishment" 22 and, thus, set the 
stage for Watson. A brief summary of the provisions of chapter 488 
follows. 
Section 1 of the statute contained the only indication that the legislature 
addressed the pivotal question posed by the Supreme Judicial Court, 
whether the death penalty served a state interest not served by life imprison-
ment. In section 1 the legislature declared that the appropriateness of 
capital punishment is a "complex factual issue" best resolved by the 
legislature (and inferentially, not by the Supreme Judicial Court). 23 After 
examining statistical studies, the legislature determined that capital punish-
ment is "most probably an effective deterrent" to certain crimes and certain 
criminals (and inferentially, a more effective deterrent than life imprison-
ment). 24 The legislature further declared that capital punishment represents 
society's legitimate manifestation of retribution against certain criminals 
and that, in the previous nine years, Congress and at least 35 states enacted 
capital punishment laws. 25 
In section 2 of chapter 488, the legislature made first degree murder 
punishable by death/6 while in section 3, the legislature set out the pro-
cedures by which the death penalty may be imposed. 27 Section 3 contained 
the requirement that after a verdict of guilty, the defendant's trial would 
resume before the same jury for sentencing purposes and that any evidence 
in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation would be considered. 21 To im-
pose death, the jury first must have found beyond a reasonable doubt at 
least one of the enumerated statutory aggravating circumstances. 29 The jury 
1979 Mass. Acts, c. 488. 
" 1979 Mass. Acts, Chapter 488, § 3 amended G.L. c. 279 and provided for the death penal-
ty only if the jury found at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances existed. These 
statutory circumstances included: 1) A murder of a police officer, 2) a murder committed by 
one who had been convicted previously either of first degree murder or of any felony involving 
the use or threat of person!li violence, and 3) a murder committed in connection with a rape or 
rape attempt./d. Furthermore, the jury could make a binding recommendation that the death 
penalty not be imposed. Although the statute listed some statutory mitigating circumstances 
for the jury to consider, the jury could recommend that the death sentence not be imposed even 
absent a finding that there were mitigating circumstances. /d. 
" /d .• § 1. 
,. /d. 
" /d. For discussion of the relevance of public opinion, see Thomas, Eighth Amendment 
Challenges to the Death Penalty: The Relevance of /reformed Public Opinion, 30 V AND. L. 
RBV. lOOS (1977); Glaser, Capital Punishment-Deterrent or Stimulus to Murder? Our Unex-
amined Deaths and Penalties, 10 U. ToL. L. RBv. 317 (1979). 
" 1979 Mass. Acts c. 488, § 2. 
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must have set out in writing the circumstance or circumstances it found, and 
the jury must have unanimously recommended death. 30 The judge was then 
required to impose the death sentence. 31 Section 3 further provided for 
automatic review of a death sentence by the Supreme Judicial Court. n The 
statute directed the Court to examine the propriety of the death sentence in 
order to ensure that its imposition was not the product of prejudice or other 
arbitrary factors. 33 The Court also was directed to compare the propriety of 
the imposition of the death sentence with similar cases it has decided. 34 
The constitutionality of the new law was presented to the Court in the 
Watson case soon after chapter 488 became law. The Watson case arose as a 
request for declaratory and other relief by the district attorney for the Suf-
folk district. 35 In examining the constitutionality of this new law, the 
Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the judicial history of capital punishment 
in the United States Supreme Court as well as in the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 36 It determined the constitutionality of chapter 488, however, solely 
under the state constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual 




" /d . 
.. /d. 
" The procedural posture of the Watson case was unusual. Unlike the typical appeal by a 
defendant who. had been found guilty and sentenced to death, Watson was an original civil ac-
tion commenced directly in the Supreme Judicial Court by the district attorney for the Suffolk 
district. /d. at 2231-32, 411 N.E.2d at 1275. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment under 
G.L. c. 231A, § 1 to determine the constitutionality of chapter 488, or, alternatively, an inter-
pretation of the statute's constitutionality through the exercise of the Supreme Judicial Court's 
power to superintend the administration of justice in all courts (G.L. c. 211, § 3). Named as 
defendants were the Commonwealth and the judges of the Superior Court. /d. Later, four men 
awaiting trial in first degree murder cases subject to Chapter 488 were substituted as defend-
ants. /d. at 2232, 411 N.E.2d at 1275. Although acknowledging that declaratory relief is 
generally unavailable during the course of a criminal prosecution, the Court held that Watson 
presented an exceptional circumstance where declaratory relief prior to conviction would be 
appropriate in order to preserve the orderly administration of criminal justice. The court found 
that the district attorney was obligated to enforce the procedural requirements of the new law 
and that declaratory relief would resolve the many problems that defendants would confront in 
preparing a defense in light of chapter 488. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2242-43, 411 N.E.2d at 
1280-81. 
" /d. at 2238-41, 411 N.E.2d at 1278-80. 
" Mass. Const. pt. 1, Art. XXVI reads in its entirety: "No magistrate or court of law, shall 
demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual 
punishments." 
The Court apparently attached no significance to the fact that the state constitutional provi-
sion is phrased in the disjunctive, while the cognate eighth amendment provision is phrased in 
the conjunctive. See Comment, Constitutional Law, 1976 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW§ 13.5, at 
388-89 n.l3; see note 67 infra. 
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Focusing on the meaning of the term "cruel" as used in art. 26, Chief 
Justice Hennessey's majority opinion noted that, like the interpretation of 
the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, the meaning of 
cruelty under art. 26 does not turn on defining what punishments were 
deemed cruel at the time of its adoption. 31 Rather, the Court indicated, art. 
26 reflects a standard that should grow and evolve as moral standards in 
society change. Like its federal counterpart, the Massachusetts article 
" 'must draw its meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.' " 39 Therefore, according to the Court, the 
constitutionality of the death penalty under the state constitution must turn 
on a determination whether such punishment is acceptable today. In 
deciding that capital punishment was not acceptable, the Court relied upon 
several different factors, including policy determinations as well as constitu-
tional interpretations. 
The first basis in support of the Court's conclusion that the death penalty 
is unconstitutional was found in society's reaction to the imposition of 
death. 40 Although acknowledging that public opinion on the issue was in-
conclusive, the Court perceptively differentiated between society's 
responses to public opinion polls on the legitimacy of capital punishment 
and society's actions in carrying out imposed death sentences. 41 The Court 
noted that no defendant had been executed in Massachusetts since 1948, 
and that, furthermore, there had been numerous executive commutations or 
reductions of death sentences during the period following the last 
execution. 42 "The complete absence of executions in the Commonwealth 
through these many years indicates that in the opinion of those several 
Governors and others who bore the responsibility for administering the 
death penalty provisions and who had the most immediate appreciation of 
the death sentence, it was unacceptable.'' 43 It appears that the Court, in 
making this observation, had concluded that, although society was willing 
to adopt a death penalty law, it hesitates to perform the final act of "throw-
ing the switch. " 44 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2243-44, 411 N.E.2d at 1281. At the time of its adoption in 1780, 
art. 26 clearly was not intended to forbid capital punishment. /d. 
" /d. at 2244, 411 N.E.2d at 1281 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 




44 In a similar fashion, one may speculate whether it may be politically expedient for a 
legislature to pass a capital punishment law, as long as no individual legislator actually imposes 
the death sentence on a defendant or carries out its command. 
Similarly, Justice Marshall has observed: "And while hundreds have been placed on death 
row in the years since Gregg, only three persons have been executed. Two of them made no ef-
fort to challenge their sentence and were thus permitted to commit what I have elsewhere 
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The second consideration which buttressed the Court's conclusion was 
the finality ofthe death penalty. Because a death penalty is irrevocable, any 
future change in the law or discovery of new evidence favorable to a defend-
ant would be of little help to the defendant after execution of a death 
sentence. 45 
The third justification proffered by the Court in its determination that 
the death penalty was unconstitutionally cruel was the ''unparalleled effect 
on all the rights of the person condemned"46-the loss of all human rights. 
Although it did not explain fully how this loss of all rights rendered the 
death penalty unconstitutionally cruel, the Court's language is reminiscent 
of the due process, fundamental right to life analysis of 0 'Neal I. 47 The 
Court may have been convinced that the evidence in favor of the death 
penalty simply did not rise to the high level required to justify state interfer-
ence with the fundamental right to life. 
Finally, the Court concluded that the death penalty was. unacceptably 
cruel because of "its unique and inherent capacity to inflict pain. " 41 The 
mental agony that is part of our system of carrying out the death sentence as 
well as the physical pain involved was, in effect, judicially noted. 49 
The Court, however, in invalidating chapter 488, did not rest solely on a 
determination that the death penalty violated contemporary standards of 
described as 'state-administered suicide.' " Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
•• The Court commented: "While this court has the power to correct constitutional or other 
errors retroactively by ordering new trials for capital defendants whose appeals are pending or 
who have been fortunate enough to obtain stays of execution or commutations, it cannot, of 
course, raise the dead.'' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2246,411 N.E.2d at 1282. 
Again, the Court's language reflects the desire to avoid arbitrariness, a desire which 
permeates the judicial analysis in the death penalty area. For example, Justice White, in his 
concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), remarked "that there is no 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which ... [the death penalty] is imposed 
from the many cases in which it is not.'' Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). So, too, the 
Supreme Judicial Court's analysis suggests that there is no meaningful basis tp distinguish be-
tween capital defendants who are fortunate enough to have obtained judicial or executive stays 
of execution and become the beneficiaries of favorable new case law, and those who are not. 
See, e.g., Evans v. Bennet, 440 U.S. 1301 (1979)(Rehnquist, J.; Circuit Justice) (granting stay 
of execution based in part on irreversible nature of death penalty). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2246, 411 N.E.2d at 1282 . 
., See text and notes at notes 6-15 supra. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2246, 411 N.E.2d at 1283. 
" Id., 411 N.E.2d at 1283, and cases-cited. The Court rejected the argument that the mental 
agony may be attributable in part to delay caused by a defendant's exercise of appellate rights. 
The Court was unable to accept such an argument in a system which treasures due process and 
the right to pursue all judicial avenues of relief from an illegal or unjust capital sentence. Id. at 
2246-47, 4UN.E.2d at 1283: 
8
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decency under art. 26. It held also that chapter 488 violated art. 26 because 
the death penalty had been administered in Massachusetts in an arbitrary 
and discriminatory fashion. 50 The Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged 
that the provisions of chapter 488 represented an attempt by the legislature 
to reduce the arbitrariness inherent in the criminal justice capital punish-
ment scheme. 51 Nevertheless, the Court concluded, "[i]t is inevitable that 
the death penalty will be applied arbitrarily. " 52 Even if chapter 488 satisfied 
the eighth amendment requirement that the jury's sentencing discretion be 
"guided" by standards which set out factors to be considered in imposing 
the death penalty, 53 the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that a sentencing 
jury simply would not be able to apply guidelines which attempted to distin-
guish between the types of murders and the types of defendants for which 
capital punishment was appropriate and those for which it was not. 54 
Consequently, the Court held that such unconstrained discretion violated 
the cruel or unusual punishment clause of the Massachusetts constitution." 
Even if chapter 488 had been found to have eliminated the arbitrariness 
inherent in the jury sentencing process, the Supreme Judicial Court con-
cluded that the statute did nothing to contain the discretion that is present in 
other aspects of the cqminal process. It was important to the Court that our 
criminal justice system vests almost unreviewable discretion in police of-
•• Id. at 2247-48, 411 N.E.2d at 1283. 
" /d. at 2248-49, 411 N.E.2d at 1284. 
52 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2247, 411 N.E.2d at 1283. 
" Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1S3, 193-9S (1976). See note 1 supra. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2249-SO, 411 N.E.2d at 1284. Justice Harlan expressed similar 
views in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971): 
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their 
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in 
language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, ap-
pear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability . . . It is apparent that ... 
criteria [in aggravation and. mitigation] do not purport to provide more than the most 
minimal control over the sentencing authority's exercise of discretion. 
/d. at 204, 207. 
This view, however, led Justice Harlan to a position contrary to that taken later by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in Watson: "In light of history, experience, and the present limitations 
of human knowledge, we rmd it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled 
discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to 
anything in the [federal] Constitution." /d. at 207 (citation omitted). 
Of course, the McGautha view was rejected later by the holding of the 1976 death penalty 
cases that the eighth amendment forbids unrestrained discretion on the part of the sentencing 
body to impose death. See generally, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1S3 (1976); id. at 193, n.43. 
" 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2249-SO, 411 N.E.2d at 1284. 
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fleers, 56 prosecutors, 57 defense counsel, 51 and to a certain extent, even in the 
trial judge." The Court noted that, "(i]n the totality of the process, most 
life or death decisions will be made by these officials, unguided and un-
curbed by statutory standards."60 Leaving these crucial decisions to 
"chance and caprice" was found to be unsatisfactory. The Court restricted 
the scope of its analysis to death penalty cases, however, anticipating an at-
tempt to apply the reasoning in Watson to non-capital sentences. The Court 
held that "chance and caprice" were prevented constitutionally from influ-
encing the sentencing process only in death penalty cases. 61 
Justices Braucher, Wilkins, and Liacos all concurred in Chief Justice 
,. A police officer may exercise discretion by simply deciding not to arrest a suspect. 
" A$ the Court stated: 
For reasons which may be valid in the context of his duties, but which do not assist 
evenhandedness, the prosecutor in a homicide case may forego a first degree murder in-
dictment and seek an indictment for ... a lesser charge. Also, in a first degree murder 
case, ... the prosecutor may in his uncurbed discretion nol prosse that part of the in-
dictment which charges murder in the first degree. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2250-51, 411 N.E.2d at 1285. 
" An attorney's particular choice of defense strategy, which may result in a conviction and a 
capital sentence, has elements of chance and vagary. 
" The trial judge has almost unreviewable discretion in accepting a plea bargain of a lesser 
included offense and dismissing the first degree murder charge. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2251, 
411 N.E.2d at 1285. 
•• /d. at 2250, 411 N.E.2d at 1285. The Court also noted that capital punishment was im-
posed on defendants in Massachusetts in a racially discriminatory fashion. Id. The Court rec-
ognized that the disproportionate impact of capital punishment fell on the poor, on blacks, 
and on members of unpopular groups. /d. The Court also cited various post-1976 statistical 
studies confirming the discriminatory application of the death penalty. !d. at 2251, 411 N .E.2d 
at 1285. 
In a similar fashion, Justice Douglas, taking the position that an "equal protection" theme 
was implicit in the eighth amendment, has remarked: "Yet we know that the discretion of 
judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, 
feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or 
if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position 
may be in a more protected position." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, 
J., concurring). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2251,411 N.E.2d at 1285. The United States Supreme Court also has 
restricted the impact of some of its decisions to death penalty cases. The Court has recognized 
that the possibility of a death penalty may require more stringent procedures than those used in 
cases in which the death penalty is not available. (See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). Such an approach has beenused by the United 
States Supreme Court also in determining whether the procedure leading to the death penalty 
violates the fundamental fairness required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (capital sentencing scheme which 
allowed the trial judge to impose death based on a confidential probation report violative of 
due process); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (exclusion of relevant hearsay evidence dur-
ing a capital sentencing hearing violates due process). 
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Hennessey's majority opinion in Watson, although each wrote a separate 
concurring opinion. Justice Braucher expressed his concern with that part 
of the opinion holding that the death penalty violates contemporary stand-
ards of decency, in particular due to legitimate differences of opinion on the 
utility of capital punishment. 62 Yet, he readily agreed with that part of the 
opinion holding that the death penalty has been imposed arbitrarily, often 
because of executive clemency and federal court "intervention. " 63 Further-
more, he agreed that the agonizing delay that occurs between the sentencing 
and the execution constituted a cruel and unusual method of punishment 
and thus, violated the Commonwealth's constitution. 64 Justice Wilkins 
noted briefly that he would have preferred not to have reached the merits of 
the constitutional issues. Rather, Wilkins would have preferred to await 
normal appellate review at the request of a defendant sentenced to death 
under the provisions of the new statute. 6 ' Justice Liacos wrote a lengthy 
concurring opinion in which he described the physical and mental torture 
inherent in the death penalty, which he likened to state-imposed torture, in-
consistent with human dignity and spiritual freedom. 66 In addition, Justice 
Liacos emphasized that the disjunctive phraseology of art. 2667 required 
rev!ew under the state constitution, as the Court had done, independent of 
the meaning of the federal constitution. 68 
62 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2254-55, 4ll N.E.2d at 1287 (Braucher, J., concurring). 
63 /d., at 2255, 4ll N.E.2d at 1287. For an informative overview of litigation techniques by 
attorneys representing condemned defendants and the use of federal habeas corpus to obtain 
stays of execution, see J. Greenberg, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 444-46 (1977). For a recent illustration of the use of 
habeas corpus to postpone a death sentence, see Potts v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ga. 
1980). 
6
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2255-56, 4ll N.E.2d at 1287. 
6
' /d., (Wilkins, J., concurring). See note 35 supra. 
66 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2268, 4ll N.E.2d at 1294 (Liacos, J., concurring). Justice Liacos 
referred to a narrative description of the debilitating mental condition of Henry Arsenault, a 
convicted murderer on death row. This description came from Arsenault's prose amicus brief 
submitted to the Court. /d. In a dissent, Justice Quirico contended, however, that the use of 
such a brief, not under oath, for factual conclusions, was unfair: "If ... [Arsenault's] descrip-
tion of his ordeal while under sentence of death is accurate, it would be appropriate for submis-
sion to the Legislature for its consideration of the 'expediency, wisdom or necessity' for capital 
punishment, but that is not what we are asked to decide in this case." /d. at 2283, 4ll N.E.2d 
at 1302 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
6
' See note 37 supra. Justice Liacos commented that the Supreme Judicial Court 
has not decided whether the phrase "cruel and unusual" [in the eighth amendment] and 
the phrase "cruel ... [or] unusual" [in art. 26] have the same or a distinct meaning ... 
I would go further and state that art. 26 stands on its own footing ... [and] hold that a 
punishment may not be inflicted if it be either "cruel" or "unusual." 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2259, 4ll N.E.2d at 1289. 
6
' /d. at 2258-59, 4ll N.E.2d at 1289. 
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Only Justice Quirico dissented, emphasizing that the Court's invalidation 
of chapter 488 raised serious separation of powers questions. 69 The proprie-
ty of capital punishment, according to Justice Quirico, should be an issue 
reserved for the legislature, which can best determine contemporary moral 
standards and public policy. 70· Only in the absence of a rational basis of fact 
to support the legislative conclusion, Justice Quirico contended, may the 
Court override the legislative will. 71 
In the Watson case, one can detect an effort by the Supreme Judicial 
Court to avoid a direct confrontation with the legislature over the existence 
of a compelling state interest in support of the death penalty. A fair reading 
of the earlier 0 'Neal cases suggested that such a "fundamental right-com-
pelling interest'' analysis would be adopted by the Court in order to avoid 
the controversial debate and "morass" which prior analyses of the eighth 
amendment had engendered. 72 Even though the death penalty had ·been 
upheld under the eighth amendment by the United States Supreme Court in 
1976, the Supreme Judicial Court in Watson still could have rejected the 
death penalty by using a "fundamental right" analysis under the state con-
stitution. Rather, the Watson Court adopted a more traditional, eighth 
amendment-type approach, although utilizing the stricter' standard de-
manded by art. 26 of the Massachusetts constitution. Insofar as the death 
penalty was held to violate art. 26 because the penalty is offensive to con-
temporary standards of decency, the Court has accepted the view already 
espoused by a minority of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the 
eighth amendment. 73 Insofar as the death penalty violates art. 26 because it 
has been imposed arbitrarily, the Court concurs with the United States 
Supreme Court, which has condemned the ·unrestrained discretion of a 
sentencing body in imposing a death sentence. 74 Unlike the United States · 
Supreme Court, however, the Supreme JudiCial Court has rejected the solu-
" Id. at 2270, 411 N.E.2d at 1295 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
10 Justice Quirico stated that the majority opinion strips the Massachusetts legislature of all 
power to require the death penalty. Id. He indicated that until the Supreme Judicial Court 
overrules Wats'on, capital punishment may not be imposed by the legislature. ld. 
" Id. at 2275, 411 N.E.2d at 1298. Section 1 of Chapter 488 itself lists the "facts" found by 
the legislature in support of the death penalty. See text and notes at notes 21'-25 supra. Justice 
Quirico did not accept the Court's determination in the O'Neal cases that recognition of the 
fundamental nature of life would require more than a rational basis test in order to uphold a 
death penalty law. See pote 12 supra. 
" See Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 367 Mass. 440, 447, 327 N.E.2d 662, 666 (1975). 
" See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 227-31 and 231-41 (1976) (Brennan, J., and Mar-
shall, J., respectively, dissenting). 
•• Furman v. Oeprgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was interpreted by Justice Stewart's plurality 
opinion in Gregg. "Furman held that ... [the death penalty] could not be imposed under 
• sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary 
' and capricious manner. 428 U.S. at 188. Seealio Id. at 169 n.l5; Note, Death as a Penalty for 
RQPe is Cruel and Unusual Pu,lishment, 1978 WISC. L. REV. 253 (1978). 
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tion of guiding sentencing discretion by requiring that the sentencing body 
consider several statutory factors. The Supreme Judicial Court has deemed 
that the statutory factors approach is insufficient to decrease the risk of ar-
bitrary imposition of the death penalty by the sentencing body. The 
Massachusetts Court also has concluded that discretion in other aspects of 
the criminal justice system, as wen· as the racial prejudice that is present in 
capital cases, requires a rejection of the death penalty in Massachusetts. 
It is unlikely that Watson will be overruled in the immediate future, given 
the views of six of the seven Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, as ar-
ticulateq in Watson. Therefore, state constitutional amendment appears to 
be the only available route for those who advocate the death penalty. Fur-
ther judicial involvement in this field will not be obviated, however, even by 
an express constitutional amendment permitting the legislature to enact a 
death-penalty law. On the federal level, the United States Supreme Court 
has been called upon to decide a plethora of death penalty cases since its 
1976 opinions specifically upholding the death penalty. As a result, there 
have been many judicial refinements of the 1976 standards during the past 
few years. 
The Watson case highlights a theme mentioned earlier-the attention 
now being given to state constitutional provisions." In 1927, Justice 
Holmes remarked that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments. " 76 During the 
1960s and the early part of the 1970s, as constituional arguments concerning 
state statutes focused almost exclusively on federal constitutional law, one 
could similarly remark that state constitutional provisions were the usual 
last resort of constitutional arguments. State constitutional arguments have 
become, however, a productive source of protection for individual rights. 
In light of its decision in Watson affirming that the meaning of art. 26 of 
the Massachusetts Constitution is not limited to the meaning of its federal 
counterpart, 77 the Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that art. 26 will 
permit more judicial intervention into the legislative prerogative than does 
the eighth amendment. 71 In so doing, the Court moves the focus of the clash 
between the judicial role and the legislative role in a democratic society 
" See text and notes at note S supra. 
76 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
" In determining contemporacy community standards in Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Judicial Court necessarily has a narrower focus than the United States Supreme Court. Disuse 
of the death penalty in Massachusetts for over 30 years may indeed reflect contemporary stand-
ards of the Massachusetts community, but does not necessarily reflect contemporary com-
munity standards across the country. In determining national community standards under the 
federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court must therefore take into account widely 
differing conditions. See generally, Schwartz, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: A 
Quest/or a Balance Between Legal and Societal Morality, 1 LAw & PoLICY Q. 285 (1979). 
" For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment also . 
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awayfrom the more familiar themes of federal constitutional law and the 
proper relationship between the federal government, and in particular, the 
federal courts, and state legislative power to a different level-separation of 
powers between the Massachusetts legislature and the state courts, and in 
particular, the Supreme Judicial Court. 79 Whereas the clash between federal 
and state power in the capital punishment area has been resolved in favor of 
federal judicial restraint, 10 the Watson case tips the balance in favor of state 
judicial activism. The admonition recalled by Justice Quirico in his Watson 
dissent that " 'legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and 
welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts' " 81 has, after 
Watson, a hollow ring as far as capital punishment in Massachusetts is con-
cerned. 
§ 2.3. First Amendment: School Prayers. The 1980 Survey year saw yet 
another chapter in the confrontation between the Massachusetts legislature 
and the Supreme Judicial Court over the proper role of religion in the public 
school classroom. 1 In Kent v. Commissioner of Education/ the Supreme 
Judicial Court, relying primarily on the school prayer cases decided by the 
United States Supreme Court during the 1960s, 3 unanimously held that 
General Laws chapter 71, section 1A, which provided for prayers in public 
schools to be offered by student volunteers, violated the establishment 
serves to proscribe punishments that are grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense 
committed. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty disproportionate 
for crime of rape); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). However, in 1980 the 
Supreme Court indicated that "disproportionality" analysis is primarily restricted to capital 
punishment cases. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Therefore, a defendant who is at-
tacking a Massachusetts non-capital sentence on the basis that it is disproportionate would be 
well-advised to rely on art. 26 of the Massachusetts Constitution and to urge adoption of a 
standard more stringent than that enunciated in Rummel. See generally, Opinion of the 
Justices to the House of Representatives, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1781, 1791, 393 N.E.2d 313, 
318-19. 
" Unlike the federal Constitution, which contains no explicit statemen~ of separation of 
powers, art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights specifically provides: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise 
the executive and judicial powers or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the 
legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the 
legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of 
laws and not of men. 
See generally, New Bedford Standard-Times Publishing Co. v. Clerk of the Third Dist. Court 
of Bristol, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 515, 522-25, 387 N.E.2d 110, 113-15, and cases cited. 
•• See note 1 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2284, 411 N.E.2d at 1302· (Quirico, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
§ 2.3. ' For an earlier treatment of this topic, see O'Reilly, Constitutional Law, 1971 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW§ 16.1 at 408. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 803, 402 N.E.2d 1340. 
' Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962). For a discussion of these cases, see note 23 infra. 
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clause of the first amendment. 4 In a later development during the Survey 
year which supports the result of the Kent case, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Stone v. Graham,' reiterated that the school prayer cases of the 
1960s still remain good law. 6 In Stone, the Supreme Court held that a Ken-
tucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in each 
public school classroom likewise violated the establishment clause. 7 
The plaintiffs in Kent were public school children who brought an 
original action in the Supreme Judicial Court against various state and local 
officials' seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement 
of the new school prayer law. 9 The school prayer law provided for a daily 
prayer to be said by a student volunteer, although students who did not wish 
to participate in the prayer could be excused. 10 The Plaintiffs contended 
• The first amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. I. 
' 101 S.Ct. 192 (1980). 
' !d. at 193-94. 
' !d. at 194. 
' The defendants were the Commissioner of Education and the members of the school com-
mittees and the school superintendents of the towns in which the children attended school. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 803-04, 402 N.E.2d at 1340. 
' The particular version of G.L. c. 71, § 1A at issue was enacted by Acts of 1979, c. 692. A 
prior version of the statute provided merely for a one-minute daily period of silent meditation 
or prayer in all public schools. See 1973 Acts c. 621. The former version was held constitutional 
by a federal district court in Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337, 340 (D. Mass. 1976). See 
note 25 infra. 
•• The statute provided: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools the 
teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that a 
period of prayer may be offered by a student volunteer, and during any such period an 
excusal provision will be allowed for those students who do not wish to participate. 
1979 Acts c. 692. The statute became effective on February 5, 1980. After expedited oral argu-
ment, the Court issued an order on March 13, 1980, granting the plaintiffs both declaratory 
and injunctive relief. A full opinion explaining the March 13 order followed within two weeks. 
Hence, chapter 692 was in effect for over a month prior to the Court's 'determination that it 
was unconstitutional. An agreed statement of facts filed in Kent provides insight into the 
operation of the statute in those schools where the statute was followed: 
At the commencement of classes each day, teachers in the respective schools announced 
the period of prayer. In many cases student volunteers offered audible prayers, some 
denominational (such as the Lord's Prayer or "Hail, Mary"), some clearly religious but 
not clearly denominational, some for secular objectives (such as the release of the 
hostages in Iran or victory in a volleyball game). When there were multiple volunteers, 
the teacher selected the one to offer prayer. Where no pupil volunteered, no prayer was 
given. Some pupils (including various of the plaintiff children) utilized their excusal 
rights; in those instances, the pupils were told to go to the corridor or to another part of 
the classroom apparently out of hearing of the prayer. Teachers in some schools ex-
cused themselves from listening to pupils' prayers. No disturbances on account of the 
implementation of§ 1A were reported to the Commissioner up to February 14. There 
was no evidence that pupils of any age were unable to comprehend that school prayers 
15
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that section lA violated both the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, as applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, and 
cognate provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. 11 The Court did not 
reach the Massachusetts constitutional issues, however, because the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution provided adequate grounds 
for the Court's decision. 12 
The Court began its examination of the statute by determining that sec-
tion lA required that a religious activity be performed in the public schools. 
Thus, the statute implicated the ''establishment of religion'' component of 
the first amendment. 13 The Court noted that section lA required a 
"prayer," which by its nature is intrinsically religious! 4 The prayer re-
quired by section lA was part of a program sponsored and implemented by 
the state in the public schools every day!' Teachers had a direct role in the 
program by announcing the prayer period and by selecting the volunteer! 6 
The Court found that although the prayer could be characterized as volun-
tary in nature-a student could be excused from participation-this volun-
tary nature did not insulate the prayer statute from establishment clause at-
tack!7 
were not school "lessons" to be learned like other aspects of the school program. 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 805-06, 402 N.E.2d at 1341. 
11 Id. at 8os, 402 N.E.2d at 341. 
12 /d. at 813, n.14, 402 N.E.2d at 1345, n.14. 
" Id. at 806, 402 N.E.2d at 1341-42. 
" Id. at 806, 402 N.E.2d at 1342. The Court differentiated between prayers which "serious-
ly invoke ... the Deity" and "those customary or traditional references to God whicm have 
become merely ceremonial and have lost devotional content." /d. (citing Colo v. Treasurer and 
Receiver Gen., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1893, 1905-06, 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1200-01). In Colo, the 
Court held that employment of chaplains by the Massachusetts legislature and the practice of 
opening the daily legislative session with prayer did not violate the establishment clause of the 
United States Constitution or the religion clauses of the Massachusett$ Constitution. /d. 
Noting that the United States Constitution does not require complete separation of church and 
state, the Court commented that "[t]he complete obliteration of all vestiges of religious tradi-
tion froin our public life is unnecessary to carry out the goals of nonestablishment and religious 
freedom set forth in our State and Federal Constitutions." 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1908, 392 
N.E.2d at 1201. Accord, Stone v. Graham, 101 S.Ct. 192, 196 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). 
For a discussion of the circumstances under which an activity may be considered "religious" 
for establishment clause purposes, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI1UI'IONAL LAW § 14-6 
(1978); see also, Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976) (upholding constitu-
tionality of an earlier version of G.L. c.71, § 1A, which provided for a period of silent 
"meditation or prayer"). 
" 19So Mass. Adv. Sh. at 805, 402 N.E.2d at 1341. 
" /d. at 806, 808, 402 N.E.2d s,t 1342, 1343. 
" /d. at 806, 402 N.E.2d at 1342. The establishment clause is directed at governmental 
neutrality toward religion, and thus a showing that the goverriment has compelled student in-
volvement in the prayer is unnecessary. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U,S. 421, 430 (1962); Abington 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963). 
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As support for its reasoning, the Court examined the similarities between 
Kent and a 1971 Massachusetts case, Commissioner of Educ. v. School v. 
Comm. of Leyden. 11 In Leyden, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionali-
ty of a local school committee resolution which provided for a five-minute 
period of voluntary participation "in the free exercise of religion" before 
the official commencement of the school day. u The state commissioner of 
education sought to enjoin the school committee from implementing the 
resolution. 20 Although the commissioner of education contended that the 
resolution violated both the state and the federal constitutions, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, as it did later in Kent, found that applicable Supreme Court 
cases made resolution of the federal constitutional issue simple: 
The Supreme Court thus far has not limited the broad language with 
which . . . it has held invalid substantially nondenominational and 
neutral religious observances on public school property. Until and 
unless such a limitation takes place (even if there is minimal State en-
couragement of only insubstantial school religious exercises), it would 
serve no useful purpose to attempt to draw any fine distinction be-
tween those observances which have hitherto been proscribed by the 
Supreme Court and the Leyden practices now presented for our 
scrutiny. We think that, under the applicable First Amendment deci-
sions, neither students nor teachers may be allowed to participate in 
the well-intended observances on school property authorized by the 
Leyden resolution. 21 
11 3S8 Mass.776, 267 N.E.2d 226, ce.rt. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971) . 
.. /d. at 777-78, 267 N.E.2d at 227. The text of the school committee resolution read: 
On each school day, before class instruction begins, a period of not more than five 
minutes shall be available to those teachers and students who may wish to participaie 
voluntarily in the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by our United States Constitu-
tion. This freedom of religion shall not be expressed in any way which will interfere with 
another's rights. Participation may be total or partial, regular or occasional, or not at 
all. Non-participation shall not be considered evidence of non-religion, nor shall partici-
pation be considered evidence or recognizing an establishment of religion. The purpose 
of this . . . [resolution] is not to favor one religion over another nor to favor religion 
over non-religion, but rather to promote love of nei8hbor, brotherhood, respect for the 
dignity of the individual, moral consciousness, and civic responsibility; to contribute to 
the general welfare of the community and to preserve the values that constitute our 
American heritage. 
/d. at 777, n.1, 267 N.E.2d at 226, n.l. 
•• /d. at 776-77, 267 N.E.2d at 224. 
21 /d. at 780, 267 N.E.2d at 228. The Supreme Judicial Court's language in Leyden as well as 
the following lanauge in Kent seems to reflect dissatisfaction with the federBI constitutional 
result: "Neither the diligence of counsel nor our own reading has discovered any 'limitation' 
[referring to the language of Leyden quoted in the text] in later Supreme Court decisions so far 
as concerns the issue of prayer in public schools." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 809, 402 N.E.2d at 
1343. It is an academic question whether the Supreme Judicial Court would be inclined to in-
terpret the Massachusetts Constitution to allow such prayers today, given current interpreta-
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In Kent the Court found section lA to be more vulnerable than the Leyden 
resolution, because the prayer period under section lA took place during 
official school hours and under the supervision of teachers. In addition, the 
Court found the religious nature of the exercise under section lA to be more 
apparent than the religious nature of the "free exercise of religion" in-
volved in Leyden, since under section lA school officials "were to see that 
prayer and not something else was offered .... " 22 
In analyzing the constitutionality of the statute in Kent, the Supreme 
Judicial Court reiterated the test enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court to determine whether a law violates the establishment clause: " '[T]o 
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular 
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion. • " 23 In examining the secular purpose behind section lA, the 
tion of the establishment clause of the first amendment. Compare Spiller v. Inhabitants of 
Woburn, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 127 (1866) and Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 
N.E.2d 109 (1955) with Attorney General v. School Committee of North Brookfield, 347 
Mass. 775, 199 N.~.2d 553 (1964) and Waite v. School Committee of Newton, 348 Mass. 767, 
202 N.E.2d (1964). See generally, Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REv. 887, 891-97 (1980). See note 50 infra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 808, 402 N.E.2d at 1343 (emphasis added). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 809, 402 N.E.2d at 1343, (quoting Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, at 222 (1%3)) (emphasis by the Supreme Judicial Court). In Schempp, 
the Court held that the reading of bible verses without comment at the opening of the school 
day and recitation of the Lord's Prayer under the supervision of school teachers violated the 
establishment clause. /d. at 205. See generally, Mere!, The Protection of Individual Choice: A 
Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805 
(1978). 
The Schempp decision itself relied on another school prayer case decided the previous year, 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1%2). In Engel, the Court examined the constitutionality of a 
non-denominational prayer which the New York Board of Regents had required to be recited 
daily in the public schools. The prayer reads as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our 
dependence upon Thee, and we beg thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
country." /d. at 422. In response to a challenge by parents of children attending the public 
schools, the Court held that the prayer violated the establishment clause; /d. at 424-25 .. The 
Court stated that a prayer composed by government officials as part of a government program 
to further religious beliefs "breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and 
State." Id. at 425. Despite the Board of Regents claim that the prayer was non-denominational 
and that it was based upon our spiritual heritage, the Court was explicit in defining the limits of 
state action with respect to the establishment clause. The "Establishment Clause ... does not 
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment 
of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-
observing individuals or not." /d. at 430. 
The United States Supreme Court has developed a three-part test for a statute to meet the re-
quirements of the establishment clause: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.' " Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted). See also 
18
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 5
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/5
§ 2.3 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57 
Court found that a change in 1979 in the language of section lA from 
"silent meditation" to "prayer" was a critical factor compelling invalida-
tion of the statute. 24 The term "prayer" gave the statute a religious mean-
ing, because a prayer is by definition addressed to the Deity. 25 Even if a stu-
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961). 
The Supreme Judicial Court has noted that there appears to be a fourth factor that has been 
implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court: "whether the challenged practice has a 'divisive 
political potential.' "Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1893, 1904, 
392 N.E.2d ll95, 1200 (citation omitted); Kent v. Commissioner of Education, 1980 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 809-10, n.ll, 402 N.E.2d, at 1344, n.ll. If the statute fails any one of the tests, the 
establishment clause has been violated. In Kent, the Court examined only the first two factors 
of the test. The Supreme Court has used the "excessive government entanglement" test 
primarily in cases involving public funding of religious activity. The Supreme Judicial Court 
has indicated that these four factors are also appropriate guides for interpreting the religion 
clauses of the Massachusetts Constitution. Kent v. Commissioner of Educ., 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 809-10, n.ll, 402 N.E.2d at 1344, n.ll. See also, Colo v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 
1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1903-04, 392 N.E.2d at 1200. See generally, Hitchcock, The Supreme 
Court and Religion: Historical Overview and Future Prognosis, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 183 
(1980). 
" See note 9 supra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 810, 402 N.E.2d at 1344. See also note 10 supra. The Court 
distinguished the ordinary meaning of ''prayer'' from ''meditation or prayer,'' citing Gaines v. 
Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976). 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 810,402 N.E.2d at 1344. 
In upholding the constitutionality of a period of silent meditation or prayer, as was then pro-
vided by G.L. c.7l, § lA, the federal district court in Gaines noted that "prayer" has a 
specifically religious meaning and referred to Webster's definition of the term. 421 F. Supp. at 
343, n.8. 
Professor Tribe would analyze the problem of prayer versus meditation by classifying that 
which is apparently non-religious from that which is clearly religious. Under the establishment 
clause anything that is "arguably non-religious" would not come within the strictures of the 
first amendment. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 14-6, at 826 (1978). Meditation 
is arguably non-religious while prayer is clearly religious and, therefore, if offered in public 
schools, in violation of the establishment clause. /d. at 829, n.lS. 
In contrast to "prayer," "meditation" connotes serious reflection and contemplation on a 
subject which may be religious, irreligious, or nonreligious. Gaines, 421 F. Supp. at 342. The 
Gaines court noted that the statute, as it then existed, reflected a sensitivity on the part of the 
legislature. Originally, a draft of the bill had proposed "meditation" and "prayer." The 
change to the disjunctive, "meditation" or "prayer," was a critical factor which rendered the 
statute neutral and ultimately served as the court's basis for characterizing the statute as 
secular in nature. /d. at 343-44. But see, DeSpain v. Dekalb, 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, 39C U.S. 906 (1968), where the required reading did not pass the secular purpose test. 
The Court in DeSpain ordered injunctive relief against school officials who required the 
following to be recited: "We thank You for the flowers so sweet; we thank You for the food we 
eat; we thank You for the birds that sing; we thank You for everything." Even though the 
verse never mentioned the Deity explicitly, the Court reasoned that the secular purposes of the 
verse were adjunctive and supplemental to its religious purpose. /d. at 839. Thus, while school 
officials argued that the purpose of the verse was to instill in children appreciation and 
gratefulness for the world around them, the Court held that the main purpose of the verse was 
the "religious act of praising and th~nking the Deity." /d. Admittedly, encroachment on the 
first amendment appeared to be minor, but citing Schempp, the DeSpain court maintained that 
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dent were to offer a "prayer" seeking secular objectives, such as release of 
the hostages, the Court still would hold the statute to be flawed. "The ques-
tion is not what a suppliant asks but to whom he addresses his 
supplication."26 Because of the deliberate choice ofthe word "prayer" with 
its religious connotation, the statute failed to meet the first aspect of the 
establishment clause test, which requires a secular legislative purpose. 27 
The Court then turned to the second aspect of the establishment clause 
test, whether the statute has a purpose or effect which advances or inhibits 
religion. Again, the statute failed to meet the constitutional standard. 28 Re-
jecting the argument that section 1A could not advance religion both 
because of its voluntary nature and because of the excusal provision, the 
Court determined that "the statute lent no small degree of official recogni-
tion and sanction to the religious enterprise and welded it into the school 
day. "2' 
Given the applicable Supreme Court precedents in this area, the version 
of the school prayer law challenged in Kent was clearly unconstitutional. 
The Massachusetts legislature apparently ignored not only the Supreme 
Court precedents, but also the earlier Leyden case and the federal district 
court decision in Gaines v. Anderson,30 which carefully distinguished be-
tween meditation and prayer. By enacting the 1979 amendment to section 
1A, the legislature may have responded to what it perceived to be the desires 
of the populace, regardless of the fate that the statute would face inevitably 
in the courts. 31 Although the issue of the constitutionality of a proposed 
statute may not be the primary concern of legislators, a law-making body 
does a disservice to the public when the lawmaking body enacts a statute 
such as section 1A, despite overwhelming case law against the statute's 
validity. By enacting statutes which are patently unconstitutional, on the 
a de minimis encroachment is not a defense to a first amendment violation. ld. The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Kent followed this reasoning also. 1980 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 811, 402 N.E.2d at 1344. See also, Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 957 (1965). 
26 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 810-11, 402 N.E.2d at 1344 . 
• , Id. 
•• Id. at 811, 402 N.E.2d at 1345 . 
., Id. 
•• 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976). See note 25 supra. 
" After the Kent decision, the legislature once again amended G.L. c. 71, § 1A. As amended 
by Acts of 1980, c.144,.the statute now reads: 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools the 
teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held shall announce that a 
period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation 
or prayer, and during any such period silence shall be maintained and no activities 
engaged in. 
The current version of the statute is similar to the version upheld by the federal district court in 
Gaines. 
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assumption that it is the judiciary's responsibility to determine their con-
stitutionality, the legislature ignores its obligation to support the constitu-
tion. 32 
Later in the year, the United States Supreme Court in Stone v. Graham 
echoed the Supreme Judicial Court's analysis in Kent with respect to the 
secular purpose of a school prayer law. 33 In Stone, the Court held that a 
Kentucky statute which required the posting of the Ten Commandments in 
each public classroom was unconstitutional because it failed to meet the 
secular legislative purpose test under the establishment clause. 34 The state 
urged the Court to find a secular legislative purpose, pointing to the 
statutory requirement of "the following notation in small print at the bot-
tom of each display of the Ten Commandments: 'The secular application of 
the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental 
legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United 
States.' " 33 Neither such a self-serving legislative characterization of the 
purpose of the provision of secular36 nor the private financing of the pur-
chases of the copies of the Ten Commandments3' was sufficient, however, 
to save the statute. Despite the "avowed" secular purpose for posting the 
Ten Commandments, the Court determined that the purpose for posting 
was "plainly religious in nature. The Ten Commandments is undeniably a 
sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation 
of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact. " 38 The fact that 
voluntary, private contributions had paid for the copies was also irrelevant 
under the establishment clause, since "the mere posting of the copies under 
the auspices of the legislature provides the 'official support of the State ... 
Government' that the Establishment Clause prohibits. " 39 Nor did the Court 
" See Satter, Changing Roles of Courts and Legislatures, 11 CoNN. L. REv. 230, 244-45 
(1979). 
" 101 S.Ct. 192, 193-94 (1980). 
•• /d. at 194. Stone was a per curiam decision, without oral argument or briefs on the merits, 
in which the Court had granted certiorari and summarily reversed a judgment of an equally 
divided Kentucky Supreme Court upholding the statute. Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Blackmun dissented from the summary reversal, and noted that they would have preferred to 
give the case plenary consideration. /d. Justice Stewart also dissented from the summary rever-
sal, but he noted that the "courts of Kentucky ... , so far as appears, applied wholly correct 
constitutional criteria in reaching their decisions." /d. at 195. Justice Rehnquist dissented both 
on the summary reversal as well as the Court's opinion on the merits. /d. at 195-96. 
" Id. at 193. 
" The Court noted that the Kentucky "trial court found the 'avowed' purpose of the statute 
to be secular." /d. 
" Id. at 194. 
" /d. (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court's characterization ofthe Ten Commandments 
as religious in nature reflects the same approach used by the Supreme Judicial Court in Kent in 
characterizing the prayer activity of G.L. c.71, § 1A as religious in nature. See note 25 supra. 
" /d. (citations omitted). 
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attach significance to the fact that the Kentucky practice involved a mere 
posting of the Bible passages on the wall as opposed to recitation of prayer 
as in the previous Supreme Court cases. 40 The establishment clause is 
violated, the Court held, by even a minor encroachment against the norm of 
governmental neutrality demanded by the first amendment. 41 
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist voiced his disagreement with the majority's 
summary rejection of the secular state purpose articulated by the Kentucky 
legislature and by the state trial court. He chided the Court for its failure to 
accord due deference to state governing bodies. 42 "The fact that the 
asserted secular purpose may overlap with what some may see as a religious 
objective does not render it unconstitutional. " 43 Justice Rehnquist main-
tained that the majority ignored the secular values of the Ten Command-
ments and its impact on the secular legal codes of the western world. 44 Fur-
ther, he contended that the Kentucky Supreme Court decision was consist-
ent with the earlier Supreme Court decision in Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp 45 because in the two companion cases decided in Schempp there 
had been either a lower court finding that there was a religious purpose or 
an admission by the state of such. 46 
Although Stone indicates that the.school prayer cases of the 1960s are still 
on a firm foundation, it appears that some of the justices are willing to re-
examine, or perhaps to limit, the parameters of the earlier decisions. 
Because the composition of the Court has changed radically since the early 
school prayer cases, the dissent of Justice Rehnquist and the brief dissent of 
Justice Stewart47 in Stone suggest that some justices are inclined to allow the 
states to operate with more autonomy on the school prayer issue. Although 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun did not articulate their views on 
the merits of the Stone issue, their desire to have given the case full con-
•• ld. (citing Schempp and Engel). 
" Id. (citing Schempp). 
" ld. at 195. Justice Rehnquist's dissent sounds the now-familiar theme of federalism and 
the respect due to the states as sovereigns functioning within the national sphere. See generally, 
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REv. 293 (1976). 
" 101 S.Ct. at 195 . 
.. ld. 
" 374 u.s. 203 (1963). 
" 101 S.Ct. at 195. See 374 U.S. at 223, 224. 
" 101 S.Ct. at 1195 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart was the sole dissenter in 1963 in 
Schempp. Justice Stewart maintained, consistent with his understanding of the framers' inten-
tions, that as long as students were not compelled to participate in school prayers, the decision 
whether to adopt school prayers should be left to the discretion of each local school committee. 
374 U.S. at 316 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a comprehensive examination of the framers' in-
tentions, see Kurland, The Irrelevance Of The Constitution: The Religion Clauses Of The First 
Amendment And The Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3 (1978). 
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sideration•• suggests that they did not believe that a reversal of the Kentucky 
Supreme Court was clearly warranted by the earlier Supreme Court 
precedents. 
The impact of Stone v. Graham on future Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court decisions regarding school prayer is unclear. Unlike the near-
ly unanimous decisions of the earlier school prayer cases, Stone may signal 
a changing attitude by some members of the Court in this area, toward the 
notion of state autonomy. Even if the states were given autonomy, 
however, the Supreme Judicial Court may reaffirm the Leyden and Kent 
results by resting its decision on state constitutional provisions. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Judicial Court may choose to adopt a state con-
stitutional approach consistent with the dissenting view of Justice Rehn-
quist in Stone, or a more flexible approach which would permit "substan-
tially nondenominational and neutral religious " 49 exercises in the public 
schools. 50 Unless the Stone decision indeed signals a retreat from prior 
school prayer cases, however, the Supreme Judicial Court likely will con-
tinue to find resort to the Massachusetts Constitution unnecessary. 
" See note 28 supra. 
•• 358 Mass. at 780, 267 N.E.2d at 228. 
•• The proposition that the Supreme Judicial Court may be willing to adopt a more flexible 
approach under the state constitution may find support in the language used by the Court in 
1971 in Leyden. The Court appears to express dissatisfaction with its invalidation of the 
Leyden school committee resolution, a result compelled by federal constitutional precedent: 
The Supreme Court thus far has not limited the broad language with which (as in 
Schempp case) it has held invalid substantially nondenominational and neutral religious 
observances on public school property. Until and unless such a limitation takes place 
(even if there is minimal State encouragement of only insubstantial school religious ex-
ercises), it would serve no useful purpose to attempt to draw any fine distinction be-
tween those observances which have hitherto been proscribed by the Supreme Court and 
the Leyden practices now presented for our scrutiny. We think that, under the ap-
plicable First Amendment decisions, neither students not teachers may be allowed to 
participate in the well-intended observances on school property authorized by the 
Leyden resolution. 
358 Mass. at 780, 267 N.E.2d at 228. In addition, unlike other areas where the Supreme 
Judicial Court has construed the Massachusetts Constitution to provide more protection than 
the federal constitution, the absence of an "establishment clause" in the Massachusetts Con-
stitution may lead the court to be more tolerant of a voluntary, nondenominational prayer if 
free to decide the issue without regard to federal constitutional law. For a discussion of the lack 
of religious neutrality, which was part of the history of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights, see Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation 
to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution 14 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 887, 891-97 
(1980). But see Kent v. Comm'r of Educ., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 809-10 n.11, 402 N.E.2d at 
1344, n.ll (establishment clause guidelines used to interpret the Massachusetts Constitution). 
The "anti-aid" amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution also prohibits appropriation or 
use of taxpayer money or property to support religious institutions. MAss. CoNST. amend. art. 
18, § 2. See generally, Bloom v. School Comm. of Springfield, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2110, 379 
N.E.2d 578. 
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§ 2.4. Right to Refuse Medical Treatment. During the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court once again considered the ramifications of the con-
stitutional right to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment. 1 In the 1977 
landmark case of Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 2 
the Court held that incompetent persons have such a right. During the 
Survey year, in Matter of Spring, 3 the Court further explained the pro-
cedure by which an incompetent's right may be exercised. In so doing, the 
Court has "fine-tuned" its earlier Saikewicz opinion, providing further 
elaboration of the "right to die" to physicians who deal with terminally ill 
patients and to attorneys who provide legal advice to the health care in-
dustry. 
In Saikewicz, the Court held that a competent person generally has a con-
stitutional right to refuse medical treatment. 4 The Court also recognized 
that an incompetent person has this same constitutional right. 5 In determin-
ing how an incompetent person could exercise this right, the Court adopted 
a "substituted judgment" test, designed to ensure that the decision toter-
minate life-supporting treatment would be the same decision that the in-
competent would make, if he were competent. 6 In addition, the Saikewicz 
Court held that for an incompetent who is a ward of the state, the officials 
of the state institution where the incompetent is a patient properly invoked 
the jurisdiction of a Massachusetts Probate Court to determine whether 
treatment should be terminated under the "substituted judgment" test. 7 In 
light of the reaction to, and the confusion about, 8 the 1977 decision, the 
Spring case provided the Court with an opportunity to analyze the 
Saikewicz case further. 9 
Earle Spring was an incompetent adult with an advanced and irreversible 
kidney disease that required hemodialysis, a blood-filtering treatment, three 
times per week. He also suffered from permanent senility. 10 Although the 
hemodialysis treatments might have kept him alive for months, and possibly 
even for years, the treatment did nothing to improve his mental condition. 
Yet, Spring would have died without treatment. 11 Spring's son, as Spring's 
§ 2.4. ' For an analysis of earlier cases dealing with this issue, see Perlin, Constitutional 
Law, 1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 7.5, at 233-39. 
' 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 405 N.E.2d 115. 
• 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. 
' /d. at 139-40, 370 N.E.2d at 424. 
• Id. at 750-51, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31. 
' /d. at 755-57, 370 N.E.2d at 433. 
• See note 46 infra. 
• For discussion of a prisoner's right to refuse medical treatment, see Commissioner of Cor-
rections v. Myers, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2523, 399 N.E.2d 452, discussed in Perlin, Constitu-
tional Law, 1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 7.5, at 233-39. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1212, 405 N.E.2d at 118. 
II /d. 
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temporary guardian, and Spring's wife, filed a petition in a Massachusetts 
Probate Court requesting that Spring's physician be ordered not to continue 
to administer life-prolonging medical treatment. Specifically, the peti-
tioners requested that the physicians be ordered to cease hemodialysis treat-
ment. 12 The Probate Court found that, if Spring were competent, he would 
choose not to receive the life-prolonging treatment. 13 Consequently, the 
probate judge ordered Spring's son to refrain from authorizing any further 
life-prolonging treatments. 14 On the motion of the guardian ad litem, 
however, the original order was stayed. 1' The probate judge then entered an 
order allowing Spring's physician, his wife, and his son to decide whether 
treatment should continue. 16 
On an appeal filed by Spring's guardian ad litem, the Appeals Court af-
firmed the Probate Court order which had vested final authority in the in-
competent's family and physician. 17 Under the Appeals Court's reading of 
Saikewicz, the courts were not required to make all medical decisions for in-
competents. Rather, the Appeals Court interpreted Saikewicz as requiring 
that the decision-maker choose the treatment that the incompetent would 
choose for himself. The Appeals Court felt that this substituted choice 
could be made by the family and the medical staff; courts should be called 
upon only when the decision is uncertain. Therefore, since Spring's family 
and doctor were capable to decide what Spring would want, the Appeals 
Court affirmed the judgment of the Probate Court. 18 
On application of the guardian ad litem, the Supreme Judicial Court 
granted further appellate review. 19 The Court reversed and remanded, 
ordering the Probate Court to enter "a new judgment ordering the tem-
porary guardian to refrain from authorizing any further life-prolonging 
treatment except by further order of the Probate Court. " 20 In effect, the 
Court instructed that the Probate Court's original order should be 
" Id. at 1210, 405 N.E.2d at 117. 
" ld. 
" Id. at 1211, 405 N.E.2d at 117. 
" !d. 
" Id. at 1211, 405 N.E.2d at 118. 
" Matter of Spring, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2469, 399 N.E.2d 493. 
" Id. at 2484, 399 N.E.2d at 502-03. 
" Due to the life and death issues involved, the Supreme Judicial Court expedited appellate 
proceedings. The application for further appellate review was filed on December 31, 1979, and 
was granted on January 3, 1980. Matter of Spring, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 135. Oral argument 
was heard on January 10, 1980, and on January 14, 1980, the Supreme Judicial Court entered 
an order reversing the Probate Court judgment on the ground that the Probate Court im-
properly left the decision to terminate to Spring's physician and family. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1211, 405 N.E.2d at 117. In its order, the Court indicated that a full opinion would follow 
later. 
•• Id. at 1210, 405 N.E.2d at 117. 
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reinstated. Thus, the Court held that the family and physician could not 
decide the incompetent's fate, once a court opinion had been requested. 
In its opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court first recounted the substantive 
rules of law which had been recognized in Saikewicz. The Court reiterated 
that, absent a countervailing state interest, a competent person has a con-
stitutional right to refuse medical treatment. 2 ' This right is based upon the 
constit\ltional right to privacy22 and upon the right of a person to resist un-
wanted infringements on bodily integrity. 23 An incompetent person, too, 
has a right to refuse treatment, but "[t]he decision should be that which 
would be made by the incompetent person, if he were competent, taking in-
to account his actual interests and preferences and also his present and 
future incompetency. " 24 
Having reaffirmed the right of an incompetent person to refuse treat-
ment, the Court then discussed the appropriate procedures by which an in-
competent may exercise this right. Noting that Saikewicz had been read by 
some to require a judicial proceeding before the termination of an incompe-
tent's life-prolonging treatments/' the Court utilized its decision in Spring 
to correct this misinterpretation. 26 The Spring opinion specifies that not 
every termination of life-supporting treatment requires judicial interven-
tion. 27 Once judicial intervention has been requested, however, the court 
must make the ultimate decision. The court may not delegate the respon-
" Id. at 1214, 405 N.E.2d at 119. 
" In Saikewicz, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that the rights of bodily ~ntegrity, 
human dignity, and self-determination were rooted both in Massachusetts law and in the 
federal constitutional right of privacy. 373 Mass. at 738-39, 370 N.E.2d at 424. The 
individual's rights are not absolute, however, and they must be balanced against countervailing 
state interests. 
For the instance where the state interest in proper administration of its prison system was 
held to outweigh the individual's rights and served to justify coerced medical treatment of an 
inmate, see Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2523, 399 N.E.2d 
452. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1214, 405 N.E.2d at 119. 
24 /d. 
" Some authorities interpreted Saikewicz as requiring a judicial proceeding, even when 
brain death had occurred. See, e.g., Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision 
Making for the Terminally II/ Incompetent, 4 AM. J. L. MED. 367, 387 (1979). The Supreme 
Judicial Court has defined brain death in the context of a homicide prosecution as death based 
on accepted medical standards. Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 252, 366 N.E.2d 
744, 747 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Golston v. Massachusetts, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1214, 405 N.E.2d at 119. 
" !d. at 1216, 405 N.E.2d at 120. It is in this regard that one may be justified in characteriz-
ing the Spring case as having "fine-tuned" the Saikewicz opinion. The Court in Saikewicz did 
not, to be sure, require, in haec verba, judicial authorization prior to termination of treatment. 
Rather, the Court stated: 
The Probate Court is the proper forum in which to determine the need for the appoint-
ment of a guardian or guardian ad litem. It is also the proper tribunal to determine the 
best interests of a ward .... Because the individual involved was thought to be incompe-
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sibility for the decision back to the family. 28 The Court suggested that, in 
determining whether a court order should be obtained, various cir-
cumstances should be considered, including: 
the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties, whether the 
patient is in the custody of a State institution, the prognosis without 
the proposed treatment, the prognosis with the proposed treatment, 
the complexity, risk and novelty of the proposed treatment, its possi-
ble side effects, the patient's level of understanding and probable reac-
tion, the urgency of decision, the consent of the patient, spouse, or 
guardian, the good faith of those who participate in the decision, the 
clarity of professional opinion as to what is good medical practice, the 
interests of third persons, and the administrative requirements of any 
institution involved. 29 
Thus, the family and physician of an incompetent should consider the 
totality of the incompetent's circumstances, in determining whether his life 
should be terminated. 
The Court also discussed the legal consequences of terminating treatment 
without obtaining judicial approval. The Court intimated that a doctor 
tent to make the necessary decisions, the officials of the State institutions properly in-
itiated proceedings in the Probate Court. 
373 Mass. at 756, 370 N.E.2d at 433. 
Other passages in Saikewicz., however, could reasonably lead one to conclude that a judicial 
procedure was necessary. Rejecting an argument that medical panels, rather than courts, 
should determine whether life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from an incompetent, 
the Court noted: 
Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached 
but passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial 
branch of government was created. Achieving this ideal is our responsibility and that of 
the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent 
the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how highly motivated or im-
pressively constituted. 
/d. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. Thus, before Spring, Saikewicz. could be interpreted as requiring 
judicial authorization for withholding life-prolonging treatment. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1210, 405 N.E.2d at 117. 
29 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1216-17, 405 N.E.2d at 121. If one were to apply these criteria to 
the Saikewicz. case, it would appear that the decision to apply for a court order was sound. 
Saikewicz was a severely retarded ward of a state institution; he had no family interested in 
becoming involved; no life-saving treatment had yet begun; and there was a need for speedy 
resolution of the issue. Saikewicz's state custodians apparently felt that judicial involvement 
was desirable, in particular due to the severe pain that would have resulted from treatment. See 
373 Mass. at 729-30, 370 N.E.2d at 419. 
In contrast, application of these criteria to Spring's case may lead to the conclusion that 
hemodialysis treatment could have been terminated without court order and without liability. 
Spring's wife and son, both of whom had been acquainted with the wishes and attitudes of 
Spring for many years, requested termination. His condition was poor, and indeed hopeless; 
the hemodialysis treatment itself was quite uncomfortable. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1211-12, 
405 N.E.2d at 118. 
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would not incur criminal liability for terminating the incompetent's life as 
long as the life-preserving treatment was terminated based on ''a good faith 
judgment that is not grievously unreasonable by medical standards." 30 The 
Court also noted that the doctor's risks would be minimized by the pros-
ecutors' discretion whether to bring a criminal charge. 3 1 
Turning to potential civil liability, an issue likely to be of greater concern 
both to physicians and to hospitals, 32 the Court commented that the law of 
negligence would govern the liability of a doctor who failed to act in a man-
ner required by good medical practice. 33 There can be no negligence, the 
Court stated, solely on the basis that a physician failed to seek court 
authorization to terminate treatment, if the court would have granted ap-
proval to terminate. 34 Furthermore, a doctor who "acts on a good faith 
judgment that is not grievously unreasonable by medical standards" likely 
will be protected. B The Court also acknowledged, however, that prior court 
approval would ''serve the useful purpose of resolving a doubtful or 
disputed question of law or fact, but it does not eliminate all rjsk of liabili-
ty. "36 
Having thus digressed to discuss the necessity of a court hearing, when 
the propriety of action taken without a hearing was not at issue, the Court 
then returned to the issue actually presented in Spring-whether the probate 
judge and the Appeals Court had erred in allowing Spring's physician and 
family to determine his fate. Applying the "substituted judgment" test, the 
Court indicated that the Probate Court's original finding, that Spring, if 
competent, would have rejected the treatment, was warranted by the 
evidence. 37 As support for this finding, the Court noted that Spring's wife 
and son, who had been close to Spring prior to his illness, believed that he 
would have chosen to terminate the dialysis. 31 The Court also noted there 
was no hope for improvement in the ward's mental state. 39 Given the 
discomfort and pain of dialysis treatment and the enormous intrusion on 
one's body caused by the blood-filtering procedure, 40 the Court determined 
•• /d. at 1217, 405 N.E.2d at 121. 
31 /d. This may prove to be of little comfort to a doctor who must go through the exposure 
and expense associated with a charge of criminal conduct, even though vindicated by a prose-
cutor's later decision not to proceed to trial. 
" See, e.g., Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Terminal-
ly II/ Incompetent, 4 AM. J. L. MEo. 367 at 372, 394 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Annas). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1218-19, 405 N.E.2d at 122. The Court also discussed the tort of 
battery in the context of consent to treatment. Id. 
,. /d. at 1219, 405 N.E.2d at 122. 
" /d. at 1217, 405 N,E.2d at 121. 
" /d. at 1219, 405 N;E.2d at 122. 
" Id. at 1210, 405 N.E.2d at 117. 
" /d. at 1220, 405 N.E.2d at 122. 
" /d., 405 N.E.2d at 123. 
•• /d., 405 N.E.2d at 123. 
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that the probate judge's application of the ''substituted judgment'' test was 
correct. Furthermore, there were no state interests, such as protecting 
dependents of the patient, preventing suicide, or maintaining ethical stand-
ards of the medical profession, sufficient to outweigh Spring's "substi-
tuted" determination to die, especially where there was no hope of 
recovery. 41 Therefore, the Court concluded that the Probate Court should 
have enforced Spring's "decision" to die by ordering that dialysis be ter-
minated. Accordingly, the Court ordered that a judgment be entered in the 
Probate Court, ordering the guardian not to authorize any further dialysis 
treatments. 42 Finally, the Court noted that in the future, court hearings in 
such matters always should be conducted in an expedited fashion. 43 
The significance of the Spring case lies in the Court's analysis of the 
methodology by which decisions to terminate life-prolonging treatment are 
to be made. The Court clarified that resort to a Probate Court is not always 
required. 44 If an application is presented to a Probate Court seeking 
authority to terminate treatment, however, the judge must make a deter-
mination whether the treatment should be terminated or not. Although a 
private decision may be made by the patient's family, physician, and 
hospital, a Probate Court which is asked to make a decision may not 
delegate that decision to those same people who, on their own, could have 
made a private decision to terminate treatment. 4 ~ 
In "fine-tuning" the Saikewicz opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court has 
stated that Saikewicz should not be read as requiring resort to the judicial 
system in all cases. 46 A guardian of an incompetent may apply to a court to 
obtain "immunity" in deciding to terminate treatment, 47 but the guardian is 
not required to do so. Without judicial authorization, however, the guard-
41 /d. at 1220-21, 405 N.E.2d at 123. 
42 /d. at 1210, 405 N.E.2d at ll7. Spring died between the time of the original Supreme 
Judicial Court order and the issuance of the Court's opinion./d. at 12ll, n.1, 405 N.E.2d at 
liS, n.l. The order, however, left open the possibility that further evidence might be brought 
to the attention of the Probate Court which would reveal a change in conditions. Hence, the 
Court left it open to the lower court to revise its findings, if necessary. 
43 Id. at 1222, 405 N.E.2d at 123-24. 
44 This aspect of the Spring opinion is obiter dicta. The Spring litigation could have been 
resolved by a determination that the Probate Court had misapplied the "substituted 
judgment" test. Perhaps the Court believed that the time had come to clarify the Saikewicz 
opinion. See note 27 supra . 
., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1210, 405 N.E.2d at ll7. 
46 Apparently, the precise meaning of the Saikewicz opinion was unclear to doctors and to 
lawyers, resulting in confusion and in hospital demands that Probate Court approval be ob-
tained in all cases prior to the withholding of life-supporting medical treatment to incompetent 
adults. See generally, Annas, supra note 32, at 385-94. Some of the overly broad language in 
the opinion may have contributed to this confusion. See note 27 supra. 
47 Of course, court authorization to terminate would offer no immunity from negligence in 
implementing the court order. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1219, 405 N.E.2d at 122. 
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ian, physician, or hospital who terminates treatment takes the risk of civil 
or criminal liability for a wrong decision. Perhaps the Probate Court forum 
may be avoided in the clear case where the likelihood of recovery for a 
"hopeless" patient is remote, where the family members who have been 
close to the patient are all in agreement, where the attending physician ad-
vocates termination, where there are no other persons who have an interest 
in the decision, where the proposed treatment would be painful, and where 
there is nothing in the patient's history which would indicate that the patient 
would prefer to live. Under these circumstances, it truly can be said that 
"the state can never demonstrate an interest compelling enough to outweigh 
the patient's constitutional right to refuse treatment as exercised by a legal 
guardian. Therefore, there is no reason to require that the legal guardian 
seek court approval before exercising the incompetent's right to refuse 
treatment .... " 48 
The Spring case may be of little comfort, however, to those who must 
decide whether to terminate treatment when it is not clear that all of these 
criteria have been met. Despite the Spring case, guardians, physicians, and 
hospitals may determine that court approval should be obtained, if only to 
avoid the risk of an erroneous decision where the consequences are so 
serious. Factors such as good faith and prosecutorial discretion49 are of 
minimal value under such circumstances. Because the decision to terminate 
treatment is so risky for the guardians and so serious for the patient, courts 
will continue to be the ultimate decision-makers in the majority of cases. 
The Spring case represents yet another example of the meticulous and 
slow process by which courts define the contours of complex constitutional 
rights. Broad constitutional principles,'0 such as those established in 
Saikewicz, demand continued examination and refinement in the courts as 
the issues become more sophisticated. The "fine-tuning" of Saikewicz in 
Spring represents a necessary consequence of the vast power of courts in 
shaping policy through case law. It is likely that judicial "fine-tuning" in 
this sensitive area of medical treatment will continue for many more years. 
" Annas, supra note 32, at 383-84 (emphasis original). 
•• See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra. 
•• For example, although Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) may have established a constitu-
tional right to abortion, courts since 1973 have been wrestling with cases which concern the 
scope of this right. There has been a broad range of issues arising from the Roe case. For exam-
ple, courts have been called upon to consider governmental funding of abortions, see, e.g., 
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) and parental consent requirements for a minor to obtain an 
abortion. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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